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THE SUBSTANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

At the end of its 2002-2003 session, the Supreme Court went back
on nearly thirty years of Voting Rights Act (VRA) precedent with its de-

cision in Georgia v. Ashcroft.1 After the 2000 census, Georgia's General
Assembly redrew its State Senate districts so as to increase the number of
Democratic seats.2 Georgia then submitted its redistricting plan not to a
Republican Department of Justice, but to the DC Circuit, for preclearance.3 By the time the Supreme Court heard Ashcroft, a bizarre set of
B.A., Yale University;J.D. expected 2006, University of Michigan. I am indebted
to Adam Blumenkrantz and his article team at the MichiganJournal of Race & Law for their
corrections and suggestions; Adam's thoughtful editing gave shape to the most unwieldy
sections of this Note. Thanks also to Professor Ellen Katz for preliminary comments.
1.
539 U.S. 461 (2003).
2.
Id. at 469.
3.
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, jurisdictions with a history of invidious
discrimination against minority voters must preclear any changes in districting with the
DOJ or the US District Court for DC. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1973c. Georgia was such a "covered jurisdiction." Its decision to preclear with the DC Court may have been grounded on
more than mere distrust of a Republican agency. The Justice Department had already
shown that it could take great liberties in construing precedent on retrogression when it
*
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alliances had formed around the case. On one side, the American Civil
Liberties Union joined Attorney General John Ashcroft in arguing that
Georgia's plan should not be precleared because it "reduced the ability of
[B]lack voters to elect candidates of their choice., 4 On the other side,
Congressman John Lewis, a veteran of the Civil Rights movement, vindicated Georgia's plan as one designed to increase Black voting strength.'
Lewis essentially adopted the traditional argument that covered jurisdictions used to make in refusing to create majority-minority districts-that
by spreading Black voters across several districts, the state was merely trying to increase Black voting strength.6
Georgia v. Ashcroft certainly challenged our traditional understanding
of the parties and arguments in racial vote dilution, but its ultimate twist
may have been the return ofJustice O'Connor's concurrence in Thornburg
v. Gingles7 as the majority-endorsed position. In Gingles, Justice Brennan
articulated a three-prong test for racial vote dilution that gauged the ability of a minority group to elect its candidate of choice." For the next 17
years, Justice Brennan's test would overshadow Justice O'Connor's protest
that ability to elect was but one factor in a "totality of circumstances." 9
Justice O'Connor's invocation of total circumstances recalls the myriad of
factors in the Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the
VRA,1° and her multifaceted inquiry suggests that, contrary to Justice
Brennan, she would have favored causation over correlation:

claimed that the Supreme Court's affirmation of a previous Georgia federal districting
plan had no bearing on Georgia's subsequent State Senate districts. See Johnson v. Miller,
929 F Supp. 1529, 1540-41 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (citing P1. Exh. 122, at 2).
4.
539 U.S. at 472. The ACLU had moved to file an amicus brief in support of the
DOJ's position that Georgia's plan was retrogressive, but that motion was denied by the
DC Circuit. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 E Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S.

462 (2003).
5.

Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472.

6.
See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND RicHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 99-100 (rev. 2d ed. Supp.

2004) ("Historicaly, the argument that black voters have more influence being spread
across many districts, rather than concentrated into a few safe ones, was the centerpiece of
the States' defense against charges that the failure to create safe districts diluted minority
voting power.").
7.
478 U.S. 30, 83-105 (1986).
8.
The three factors are: (1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) that the
minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) that the White majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. at 50-51.
9.
Id. at 96-97 (citing S. REP. No. 97-417, at 194 (1982)).
10.
See generally S. REP. No. 97-417. Section 2 of the VRA was amended in response
to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), where the Supreme Court required proof of
discriminatory purpose in a claim of racial vote dilution, thereby dismantling the effectsbased inquiry from cases like Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). Section 2 gov-
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I do not agree, however, that such evidence [of nonracial
causes to divergent racial voting patterns] can never affect the
overall vote dilution inquiry. Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group in a particular election was
rejected by [W]hite voters for reasons other than those which
made that candidate the preferred choice of the minority
group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question
whether bloc voting by [W]hite voters will consistently defeat
minority candidates."
In other words,Justice O'Connor preferred an inquiry into whether
there are nonracial causes to racially disparate voting patterns rather than
taking disparate voting patterns as emblematic of differing racial preferences. With Ashcroft, Justice O'Connor would ultimately win the twodecade tug-of-war with Justice Brennan: her vision of racial vote dilution
would resurrect totality of circumstances at the expense of the three
Gingles factors, and subsequent courts would show greater deference to
covered jurisdictions where the defeat of minority candidates of choice
can be explained by--or hidden beneath-factors apart from race.
Admittedly, the Gingles factors were never intended to be dispositive
of racial vote dilution; Justice Brennan himself suggested that they served
only as a threshold at pleading. 2 And the Court's adoption of Justice
O'Connor's Gingles concurrence was hardly unexpected; cases between
Gingles and Ashcroft had signaled that the Court was gradually embracing
Justice O'Connor's approach. 3 Nevertheless, in finding that minorities'
ability to elect would no longer be the only inquiry in potential violations of the VRA, Ashcroft effectively submerged the Gingles factors under
a broader inquiry. While Justice Brennan's three preconditions do still
serve as a threshold that must be met before the remaining totality factors
kick in, the practical effect of Ashcrofi has been to substantially diminish
their importance, so that at times they function not as preconditions but
as commonplace totality factors on par with the other factors.

erns racial vote dilution, while § 5 governs retrogression. Ashcroft was brought as a retrogression challenge, but its analysis is borrowed largely from vote dilution precedent.
11.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Significantly, the next sentence reads, "Such evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally preferred by the
minority group, might be able to attract greater [Wihite support in future elections." Id.
This anticipates substantive representation and an end to racially polarized voting, both
greatly influencing her decision in Ashcrofi.
12.
See id. at 79 ("[I]n evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution through districting, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances and to determine, based
upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters.") (internal quotations omitted) (citing S. REP.
No. 97-417, at 30).
13.
See, e.g.,Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
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This Note argues that the majority in Ashcroft have left courts with
an unadministerable standard-not so much for reasons that Justice Souter
articulated in his dissent, 4 but rather because the Court provided no
guidance on navigating around the myriad of factors in the convoluted
totality analyses. In the face of this uncertainty, lower courts will rely increasingly on the proportionality standard ofJohnson v. De Grandy,'" which
marked the midpoint in the judicial shift from Justice Brennan's worldview to Justice O'Connor's world-view. Part I examines two cases after
Ashcroft which represent different degrees of racial vote dilution: Shirt v.
Hazeltine 6 and Session v. Perry.'7 In Shirt, American Indians in South Dakota suffered a history of voting discrimination, racially polarized voting,
and a dearth of safe districts; while in Session, Blacks and Latinos in Texas
at least possessed a larger proportion of safe districts. What emerges from
the comparison, then, is the tendency of proportionality to neutralize history and polarization. Through other post-Ashcroft cases, Part II teases out
the differences (i) between influence districts as injury and remedy and
(ii) between a jurisdiction's Section 5 and Section 2 obligations--details
closely related to how proportionality is measured. Finally, Part III discusses substantive representation, the ideology that drove much of
Ashcroft's analysis. Framing it as a symptom of nonpolarized voting, this
Note concludes that endorsement of substantive representation as a device
to achieve colorblindness will obscure the causes of polarization.
I. THE PRIMACY OF POLARIZATION

A. Shirt v. Hazeltine
1. Factual Background: Shirt v. Hazeltine as
Traditional Section 2 Analysis
According to the 2000 census, American Indians constituted 9.05%
of South Dakota's total population and 6.79% of the voting age population (VAP).' 8 In 2001, South Dakota produced a plan that created 35
legislative districts, each electing one State Senator and two State Congressmen-except for District 28, which was divided into two singlemember districts, 28A and 28B, each electing one Congressman. 19 Only
14.
These include lack of guidance in measuring the "influence" necessary to avoid
retrogression. See 539 U.S. at 494-96 (SouterJ., dissenting).
15.
512 U.S. at 1000.
16.
336 F Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004).
17.
298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.Tex. 2004).
18.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 983. The opinion uses "American Indian" rather than
"Native American." On the significance of this nomenclature, see note 165 infra.
19.
Id.
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two districts were majority-Indian, 27 and 28A; every other district was
majority-White under the 2001 Plan. 2 Districts 27 and 28A straddled
much of "Indian Country," which consisted of eight rural counties where
American Indians were the majorty.2 1 Shortly after the 2001 Plan, Indian
plaintiffs filed suit against South Dakota, claiming that its redistricting
scheme diluted their voting strength by packing District 27 with a 90%
supermajority of Indians.2
Much of the court's analysis in Shirt unfolded on fairly traditional,
pre-Ashcroft grounds, treating the Gingles factors as a threshold inquiry
before looking at totality of circumstances. The first Gingles factor (Gingles
1), sufficient size and geographic compactness, was easily satisfied because
the plaintiffs could sketch five alternative plans that added at least one majority-Indian house district. 23 The second Gingles factor (Gingles 2),
political cohesion, turned on the comparative reliability of plaintiff and
defendant's experts. The plaintiff's expert estimated that American Indians
24
had generally voted with over 73% political cohesion in past elections.
By contrast, the defendant's expert found widely disparate results. 2 Ultimately, though, the court deemed that both experts had shown significant
26
Indian electoral cohesion. To reinforce that finding, the court turned to
lay testimony for nonstatistical evidence of cohesion. Witnesses pointed to
several examples of Indian social and political cohesion; additionally, Representative Matthew Michaels testified that Indians in South Dakota
constituted a community of interest. 27 Having witnessed the districting
process as Speaker of the House, Michaels• also
21 suggested that there had
been foul play in the redistricting committee.

20.
Id. at 984.
21.
Id. at 983-84. This entire area was covered under the VRA. See Bone Shirt v.
Hazeltine, 200 F Supp. 2d 1150, 1157 (D.S.D. 2002) (determining two years earlier that the
2001 Plan needed to be precleared).
22.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d 976. American Indians made up 86% of District 27's VAR
Id. at 984. Also, District 27 sat on part of Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations, which
comprise the poorest part of the United States. See Evelyn Nieves, On Pine Ridge, a String
of Broken Promises:Politicians' Talk Mean Little on Troubled S.D. Reservation, WASH. POST, Oct.
21,2004, atAl.
23.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 987. See also Houston v. Lafayette County, Miss., 56 F3d
606, 611 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that prong one focuses on whether plaintiffs can show
"that a geographically compact district could be drawn") (emphasis in original).
24.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 997.
25.
See id. at 999-1000.
26.
Id. at 1003.
27.
Id. at 1007.
28.
Id. at 985 ( where Michaels stated that he heard a pro-Plan Senator deny there
had been public outcry against the Plan, even though representatives from Districts 26 and
27 did in fact object to the boundaries). The court found Michaels's testimony persuasive
because "[h]e grew up around Indians and graduated from the University of South Dakota
law school." Id. at 1007.
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2. Gingles 2 and 3: Shirt v. Hazeltine as Anti-Ashcroft
Judge Karen Schreier, the District Judge presiding over the trial,
would find that statistical evidence and lay testimony had proven political
cohesion to the satisfaction of Gingles 2. Before arriving at that conclusion, however, she had to address South Dakota's protest that partisanship,
instead of race, explained American Indian voting. How Judge Schreier
disposed of the state objection would reveal a larger intuition pervading
the opinion: that Ashcroft has created enormous problems for racial vote
29
dilution cases.
First, the court tried to purge partisanship from the discussion on
political cohesion, pigeonholing partisanship as a causation inquiry that
belonged in the totality-of-circumstances review to come. 3 Such was the
conventional understanding of causation that had developed from a hybrid of Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Gingles.31
Causation implicates legislative purpose: both were dispelled together in
Gingles as unnecessary for a prima facie case of racial bloc voting.12 Yet
commentators have suggested that Ashcroft reintroduced purpose to VRA
Section 2 analysis in a manner that precedent did not permit.3 3 In holding
steadfast to the old dilution regime, Judge Schreier seemed to be taking
jabs at the Ashcroft majority; without ever mentioning Ashcroft, she 34concluded staunchly, "partisanship has no bearing on the Gingles factors.,

29.
Remarkably, the opinion mentioned Georgia v. Ashcroft only twice: once to resolve a dispute over using the single-race, multiple-race, or dual-race method of
identification, id. at 982; and once to elaborate on the technique of ecological inference,
id. at 1003. These were hardly the most important parts of the Ashcroft opinion. The first
reference settled a technicality about how to use the 2000 census data, which for the first
time allowed respondents to self-identify under more than one racial category. The second
reference didn't even come from the Supreme Court decision-it was drawn from the
lower court, Georgia v.Ashcroft, 195 F Supp. 2d 25, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
30.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 1008.
31.
See, e.g., Lewis v. County, 99 F3d 600,616 (4th Cir. 1996). At the time, Leuis was
one of the many lower court decisions that thought causation was irrelevant in the three
Gingles preconditions, but relevant in the totality-of-circumstances inquiry. ISSACHARoFF ET
AL., supra note 6, at 805.
32.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74 (causation and purpose irrelevant for the three Gingles
factors).
33.
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression,
1 ELECTION L.J. 21, 22 (2004) (Ashcroft "engages in the kind of non-comparative purpose
analysis that Bossier II seemed to reject, in a fashion that dramatically undercuts the statutory burden of proof, a burden born of long, bitter, and all-too-recent experience with
covered jurisdictions' indifference and hostility toward the political aspirations of minority
voters");Jocelyn Benson, Note, Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Making Georgia v. Ashcroft
the Mobile v. Bolden of 2007, 32 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485, 502-05 (2004) (contrasting
the Section 2 amendments in 1982 to City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980),
which read an intent requirement into Section 2).
34.
Shirt, 336 E Supp. 2d at 1008.
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Of course, Ashcroft preceded Shirt, and we know Judge Schreier was
conscious of its effect on political cohesion because she qualified that
statement immediately after it was made. In the very next sentence, the
court stated that even if partisanship should be considered, the evidence
could not attribute Indian voting patterns to partisanship more than
race.35 American Indian candidates of choice were, where possible, American Indians, as shown by a local organization's backing of an Indian
Republican over a non-Indian Democrat and preference for Indian candidates challenging non-Indian Democratic incumbents 36 As for low
voter turnout, another South Dakota causation argument, the court sided
with a Ninth Circuit decision in finding that low voter registration
and
• • 37
turnout demonstrate, if anything, the lack of ability to participate.
In evaluating the third Gingles precondition (Gingles 3), that Whites
vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates, the
court went the opposite direction of its approach with Gingles 2. It tackled Ashcroft not by minimizing a significant factor in that opinion, but by
emphasizing a factor belittled by Justice O'Connor: racially polarized voting. To begin with, Judge Schreier stressed that racially polarized voting
was the "keystone of a vote dilution case."-" This statement echoes Justice
Souter's vocal criticism of the Ashcroft majority when it accepted the
DOJ's statistics on racially polarized voting, but then found that factor
outweighed in its totality analysis. 39And in recounting election after election where Indian preference for a specific candidate was40upward of 70%
but the candidate lost because of lack of White crossover, Judge Schreier
demonstrated even more forcefully the factual errors underlying Justice
O'Connor's assumptions."
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 1008-09.
37.
Id. at 1009-10. See also Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F2d 1047, 1416 n.4
(9th Cir. 1988) (referring back to Gingles as authority).
38.
Shirt, 336 F.Supp. 2d at 1010 (quoting Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 54-5, S.D., 804 E2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1986)).
39.
See 539 U.S. at 486 ("Nevertheless, regardless of any racially polarized voting or
diminished opportunity for black voters to elect a candidate of their choice in proposed
Districts 2, 12, and 26, the District Court's inquiry was too narrow") (O'Connor, J.). See
also id. at 503 ("The District Court was clearly within bounds in finding that (1) Georgia's
proposed plan decreased BVAP in the relevant districts, (2) the United States offered evidence of significant racial polarization in those districts, and (3) Georgia offered no
adequate response to this evidence") (SouterJ., dissenting).
40.
Shirt, 336 E Supp. 2d at 1012-16 (looking at results from endogenous and exogenous elections alike).
41.
See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 486. Justice O'Connor seemed to believe that the diminished Black voting age population (VAP) in Georgia's redistricting plan could, in
combination with White crossover of 33%, still lead to the Black candidates of choice. Yet
in South Dakota, the plaintiffs found numerous instances where White crossover for the
Indian-preferred candidate exceeded 33% but, despite Indian voting cohesion exceeding
70%, the preferred candidate still lost. See 336 F Supp. 2d at 1012-16. To be sure, the analogy
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3.Totality of the Circumstances: Shirt v.Hazeltine
as Moving Beyond Ashcroft
A cursory glance at Shirt will reveal one of the more obvious effects
of Ashcroft: it has made racial vote dilution opinions painfully long, some
well over 100 pages. 2 The threshold inquiry of Gingles preconditions has
had to be extremely thorough, with the additional complication of causation. With every factor, courts have second guessed their conclusions, and
on a larger scale, courts have duplicated their examination of factors in
both the Gingles preconditions and the totality of circumstances Thoroughly baffled, some courts have even conflated the threshold Gingles
inquiry and the totality of circumstances, collapsing them altogether."
Shirt v. Hazeltine managed to keep its analysis fairly straightforward
and extremely thorough. In all, the court explored twelve factors. 4s Pivotal
to Judge Schreier's totality analysis, though, were the two Senate factors
that drove the 1982 Amendment-history of discrimination and racially
an th
polarized voting 46-and
the novel factor introduced by Johnson v. De
Grandy-proportionality.47 History, polarization, and proportionality anchored the remainder of the opinion: they received the lengthiest and
most sophisticated treatment, and the finding of dilution might have been
much harder-pressed had any of these three been lacking.
South Dakota's history of discrimination against American Indians
pervaded well into 2004. Indians were barred from voting in county elections as late as 1975, barred from running as county comrmissioners until
1980, and barred from voting in sanitary district elections in 1999.48 Nonelectoral discrimination included racial harassment in schools, racial profiling, and discrimination in lending.4 9 As "the poorest people in South
43

to Georgia might not be completely precise, since American Indians comprise less of
South Dakota than Blacks do Georgia.
42.
See Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d (coming in at 77 pages); see also Session v. Perry, 298 F
Supp. 2d (120 pages) and Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (160
pages). But see Metts v. Murphy, 347 E3d 346 (1st Cir. 2003), whose brevity will be considered infra, on p. 39.
43.
See, e.g., Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d 976 (racial polarization in Gingles 3 and in totality
of circumstances).
44.
See discussion on Session, 298 F Supp 2d. 451, in Section I.B. 1 infra.
45.
That is, the court looked at (1) history of discrimination, (2) racially polarized
voting, (3) use of voting procedures for discriminatory purposes, (4) access to candidate
slating process, (5) socioeconomic disparities, (6) racial appeals, (7) elected American Indian officials, (8) unresponsiveness, (9) tenuousness, (10) proportionality, (11) American
Indian candidacies, and (12) voter apathy and low turnout. See 336 F Supp. 2d at 979 (listing factors in the table of contents).
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28).
See 512 U.S. at 1000.
Id. at 1019, 1023.
Id. at 1030-32.

FALL

2005]

The Primacy of Proportionality

Dakota,""5' Indians were especially vulnerable to pretextual, rational-basis
mechanisms that burdened the poor." Even in 2004, they seemed the
paragons of discrete and insular minorities, suffering political exclusion
and historical discrimination at the level originally envisioned in Carolene
Products.52The importance accorded to the discreteness and insularity of
minorities has receded in voting rights cases, given only cursory treatment
in City of Mobile v. Bolden"3 and Nixon v. Kent County.5 4 But in 2004, South
Dakota's American Indians were bound by a legacy of flagrant discrimination that resembled, if not surpassed, that of Blacks in 1980 and Blacks
and Latinos in 1996.
Having driven much of the Gingles 2 analysis, racially polarized voting was later singled out by Judge Schreier as "one of the most important
considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis."' 5 Among the
evidence proffered was the statistic that White crossover voting was 43%
when no Indian candidates ran, but 22% percent when an Indian entered
the race. 6 Direct comparison to Georgia v. Ashcroft is difficult, since Georgia
provided only scant numbers on polarization. Yet in one instance, the state's
expert did estimate White crossover in three statewide general elections to

50.
Id. at 1040.
51.
For example, American Indians could not make it to the county offices, where
registration occurred, because travel was prohibitively expensive. Id. at 1024. Also, county
authorities would automatically register taxpayers to vote and require non-taxpayers, many
of them American Indian, to register in person. Id.
52.
See Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
53.
See 446 U.S. 55, 111 n.7 (1980) (Marshall,J., dissenting):
Unconstitutional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete political minority whose voting strength is diminished by a districting scheme proves that
historical and social factors render it largely incapable of effectively utilizing
alternative avenues of influencing public policy. In these circumstances, the
only means of breaking down the barriers encasing the political arena is to
structure the electoral districting so that the minority has a fair opportunity
to elect candidates of its choice. (citations omitted)
See also id. at 75 n.22 (Stewart, J.) ("Putting to the side the evident fact that these gauzy
sociological considerations have no constitutional basis, it remains far from certain that
they could, in any principled manner, exclude the claims of any discrete political group
that happens, for whatever reason, to elect fewer of its candidates than arithmetic indicates it
might") (emphasis added). Note how closely Justice Stewart's dismissal ofJustice Marshall's
idea resembles Justice O'Connor's view on causation.
54.
76 E3d 1381, 1401 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) ("While it is true that
all African Americans do not think alike, share the same political interests, [or] prefer the
same candidates at the polls, African Americans and other minorities share a place in history that often translates into shared political goals") (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
55.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 1034 (quoting United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d
897,903 (9th Cir. 2004)).
56.
Id. at 1035.
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be 24.73-57.39%. 7 The least charitable of Georgia's White crossover rate
would still fall short of South Dakota's abysmal 22%.
Finally, proportionality played a tremendous role in Shirt that, on
balance, seemed no less compelling than history and polarization. With
her heavy reliance on De Grandy,Judge Schreier indicated long before actually reaching the totality analysis that proportionality would be dispositive.
De Grandy was mentioned
alongside Gingles at the very beginning of the
••
58
Section 2 discussion and again at the start of the Gingles 3 analysis.5 9 The
court pounded home the fact that American Indian representation fell well
below their share of the population. 60 Here proportionality departs from the
other two factors. More than history or polarization, proportionality has the
advantage of clarity-that is, proportionality can articulate clear, achievable
goals by calculating how many majority-minority districts South Dakota
should aspire to.
In short, history, polarization, and proportionality emerge from Shirt
v. Hazeltine as the dominant totality factors. Each is a mix of the descriptive and the normative, both describing the situation in South Dakota and
offering a vision for the future: an end to discriminatory history, an end to
racially polarized voting, and proportionality between population and
majority-minority districts. Shirt, however, is a fairly easy case, where
every factor in the totality fell on the side of the plaintiffs. What happens
when the totality factors do not all cut the same way? Even more complicated, what happens when history and polarization are aligned but cut
against proportionality? Cases in the following Sections suggest that proportionality will become the default factor, the most powerful justification
for siding with a legislature or its challengers. Its principles, after all, are
easier to follow than the others, precisely because it can articulate a number. Yet proportionality also runs the danger of becoming that beast which
De Grandy tried to avoid: a safe harbor.

57.
Ashcroft, 195 E Supp. 2d at 66. But compare this statewide percentage to Senate
District 2, where in an endogenous 1999 runoff election between Regina Thomas, a Black
candidate, and a White candidate, Thomas received only 9% of the White vote. Id. at 70.
Thomas failed to capture most of the White votes even though her White opponent was
described by his own Republican Party as a "flaky, half-crazed Republican that runs for
office now and then." Id. at 58. This experience with extreme polarization may have led
Thomas to vote against Georgia's redistricting plan.
58.
Shirt, 336 F Supp. 2d at 986.
59.
Id. at 1011 (this time as an elaboration of Gingles). Again, note the conspicuous
absence of Ashcroft.
60.
American Indians constituted 9% of the state's total population, so (1) the four
majority-Indian districts in the state's 105 legislative seats left them with 44% of the power
they should have had according to proportionality, (2) the single majority-Indian district
in the state's 35 Senate seats left them with 33% of proportionate power, and (3) the three
majority-Indian districts in the state's 70 House districts left them with only 50% of proportionate power. Id. at 1048-49.VAP statistics are also available. See id.
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B. Session v. Perry

1. Partisan Purpose: Session v. Perry as Traditional Ashcroft Analysis
On October 12, 2003, the Texas legislature enacted Plan 1374C into
law, one of the first-ever re-redistricting plans.61 It had come out of a
highly visible, highly contentious adoption process, during which Democratic Senators fled the state to frustrate a quorum. 62The brainchild of
Republican legislators to increase Republican influence, Plan 1374C replaced Plan 1151C, which had governed the 2002 elections.6 Almost
immediately, the plan was challenged for mid-decade redistricting, unconstitutional racial discrimination, unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering,
and racial vote dilution.
After throwing out the re-redistricting challenge, 64 the Eastern District of Texas moved onto the merits of the claims, starting with equal
protection. In citing Washington v. Davis, 6s the court foreshadowed that it
would rule for the state not only on equal protection grounds, but also on
the issue of racial vote dilution. It spoke at length about partisan advantage, not race, being the sole motivation behind the Texas Legislature; 66 it
noted that the result was to decrease Democratic representation, which
incidentally disadvantaged Blacks and Latinos, many of whom were Democrats. 67 This mirrored the language of Justice O'Connor in Ashcroft and
Gingles, framing equal protection as a warm-up for the VRA analysis to
come. Writing for the majority, Judge Patrick Higginbotham cited Miller v.
Johnson for the directive to searchingly review blatant race-motivated districting, from which he distanced Plan 1374C. 6 Though he recognized the
history of discrimination against Blacks and Latinos in Texas, he concluded,

61.
Session, 298 F Supp. 2d at 457. Another example is People ex rel. Salazar v.
Davidson, 79 P3d 1221 (Colo. 2003).
62.
Ralph Blumenthal, State Senate Democrats Return to Texas, N.Y TMES, Sept. 12,
2003, at A18.
63.
298 F Supp. 2d at 470.
64.
See generally id. at 458-68.
65.
Id. at 469 ("a claimed denial of equal protection has required proof that discrimination was purposeful; differential or adverse impact alone is not sufficient")
(summarizing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
66.
Id. at 470-71.
67.
Id.
68.
See id. at 470 (summarizing Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)). In an even
more cynical move, the court cited a member of the redistricting committee who testified
that he had been directed by Glenn Lewis, a minority Democrat, to preserve Lewis's
House seat at all costs. Id. at 451 n.62. More obviously self-dealing than Georgia's plan
according to John Lewis, it is as if the participation of a Black Democrat absolved Plan
1374C of racial animus.
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nonetheless, that the redistricting plan had been "a political product from
start to finish. 69
When Judge Higginbotham moved to the Latino claim of racial
vote dilution in South and West Texas, he prefaced the discussion with the
legislature's "primary partisan goal." 70 By reiterating the drafters' intent to
increase Republican influence, the court made explicit what commentators have feared about Georgia v. Ashcroft: the introduction of purpose into
Section 2 analysis. 7 The dissent, which sided with the majority on all
counts but the dismantling of majority-Latino District 23, distinguished
Georgia's purpose from Texas's purpose.72 Under Judge John Ward's reading, while Georgia sought to maximize Black influence, Plan 1374 was
designed to "crush" Latino participation. 73 Nevertheless, this debate was
firmly ensconced within the parameters of Ashcroft. Both majority and
dissent cited to Ashcroft as authority. In doing so, both sides accepted, if
fought over, what Shirt could not: causation and legislative purpose.
Another Ashcroft characteristic in Session was its decentralized Section 2 analysis for Congressional District 23. Under the old plan, District
23 had had a bare majority of the Latino citizen voting-age population
(CVAP) but did not perform as an opportunity district.74 Its representative, a Republican Latino named Henry Bonilla, waned in Latino support
with each successive election, so that by 2002 he captured only 8% of the
Latino vote.7 ' To make District 23 more Republican, the legislature
pushed the border northward to rope in White Republican areas, resulting
in a district with 50.9% Latino VAP and 46% Latino CVAp7 6 A portion of
District 23, 90% Latino in VAP and 86.5% Democrat, was shifted into
adjacent District 28; in order to avoid retrogression, Plan 1374C created
another district with majority-Latino CVAP 77 In addressing the plaintiffs'
contention that an additional majority-Latino district could have been
drawn, the court would struggle to formulate a coherent Gingles and totality-of-circumstances rationale.

69.

Id. at 473.

70.

Id. at 488.

71.
See Karlan and Benson, supra note 33.
72.
Session, 298 E Supp. 2d at 517-18.
73.
Id. at 518 (Ward, J., dissenting) (adding, "I do not read Ashcroft-a decision designed to foster minority participation in the political process-to permit the state to
dismantle an existing opportunity district for political purposes so long as the loss is made
up somewhere else.").
74.
Id. at 488.
75.
Id. In the dissent, however, Judge Ward pointed out that Bonilla was not the
Latino candidate of choice if he only received 8% of their vote. Id. at 519 (Ward, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The legislature's claim of preserving Latino voting strength
seems odd, then, since it anticipated Bonilla's imminent loss. See id.
76.
Id. at 488-89.
77.
Id.
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The court stated that the plaintiffs' proposed Plan 1385C failed because of its unusually shaped districts, underscoring the difficulty of
drawing seven majority-Latino districts out of South and West Texas's irregular population distribution.78 In fact, Session's entire Gingles analysis
unfolded in one paragraph, one footnote, and a chart comparing the pe-79
rimeter-to-area and smallest-circle measurements of 1374C and 1385C.
Right away, however, Judge Higginbotham conceded the Gingles preconditions as a matter of argument, ° and the rest of the District 23 vote
dilution analysis would focus on proportionality.8 ' Ashcroft certainly permits putting the three Gingles preconditions on par with other factors in
the totality, so that satisfaction of the Gingles 3 may be washed over by
failure to demonstrate the other factors. But even Ashcroft might not have
balanced the Gingles factors, racial polarization, and history of discrimination against a singular finding of proportionality.
District 23 is an extremely difficult case, fraught with equal protection concerns, VRA requirements, and the difficulty of drawing
equipopulous districts in Texas's unique geography. To be sure, the two
other claims of racial vote dilution do get dismissed after more substantial
Gingles-style treatment. For example, Black plaintiffs challenged adjustments to District 24 in Central Texas, arguing that Plan 1374C obliterated
a coalition district. 2Yet this injury was neatly dismissed because primary

78.
Id. at 491-92. But see id. at 523 ("The majority also rejects the GI Forum plaintiffs' contention that their districts are 'compact.' But under the objective compactness
scores, several of the GI Forum plaintiffs' demonstration districts are, on balance, more
compact than those in Plan 1374C.") (Ward, J., dissenting). The majority's criticism of
Plan 1385C is curious, given that its replacement of District 23 forced it to compress the
already elongated districts of South and West Texas into flatter, longer "bacon-strip" dis-

tricts. To say that a seventh majority-Latino district would push the already irregular sixdistrict arrangement past a threshold of compactness seems disingenuous. At the very least,
it belies the functional approach to shape and compactness blessed in Dillard v. Baldwin
County Bd. Educ., 686 F Supp. 1459 (M.D.Ala. 1988). See discussion in Part I.B.3 infra.
79.
Id. at 491-93.Judge Higginbotham seemed to have struck Plan 1385C on sufficient size and geographic compactness, but it is hard to tell from the rather conclusory
discussion: "The record, however, does not show that their demonstration plan would
satisfy Gingles." Id. at 491.
80.
See id. at 492:
[E]ven if this court were to overlook the Gingles problems reflected in the
proffered demonstration plan, the GI Forum Plaintiffs have failed to make
the necessary showing under § 2. This court recognizes that Plaintiffs have
established racially polarized voting and a pohtical, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination. But any examination of the totality of
circumstances beyond Gingles must include proportionalty.
81.
82.

See generally id. at 492-97.
Id.at 482 (noting that District 24 had a Black VAP of 21.4% and a Latino VAP

of 33.6% and leaned 60% Democrat).
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contests had shown that there was no Black-Latino cohesion. 3 Still, as
Session revealed with District 23, the danger remains that in adjudicating
more tenuous plans which have met the Gingles preconditions but only a
mix of factors in the totality of circumstances, courts could invoke Ashcroft
to dismiss racial vote dilution claims because a single factor militates for
the defendant jurisdiction.
2. De Grandy Proportionality: Session v. Perry
as Moving Beyond Ashcroft
The state's main defense to the charge of racial vote dilution in District 23 was that "the effective Latino majority citizen voting age
population districts in the relevant area is more than roughly proportional
to the Latino citizen voting age population in that area.' 84 This invocation
of proportionality has two consequences: (i) it turns proportionality into
just what De Grandy decried, a safe harbor, and (ii) itshifts the fight between redistricters and challengers toward "the relevant area" of
proportionality.
After acknowledging history of discrimination and racially polarized
voting, the Eastern District of Texas would focus on South and West Texas
as the relevant area. The court attempted to prove that six out of seven
majority-Latino districts in that part of the state was close enough to the
58% of South and West Texas comprised by Latinos that a seventh majority-Latino district was not needed. 85 Proportionality so dominated the
remaining Section 2 discussion that the only cases cited, apart from
Gingles and De Grandy, were footnoted references to settle whether the
appropriate frame of reference was the entire state or South and West
Texas. 86 Session thus presents a curious variation on Shirt v. Hazeltine, with
history and polarization aligned opposite to proportionality. In Session, we
have a test for the importance of proportionality relative to the other totality factors, a comparison that Ashcroft refrained from touching. Still, it
does seem from Session that proportionality has moved from a necessary
part of the totality analysis to a sufficient part of the dilution analysis. 87
With all other factors pulling for plaintiffs, the single finding of proportionality dictating the verdict converts a demonstrable link between
83.
Id. at 484 (finding that, if anything, the success of Black candidates of choice in
District 24 could be attributed to crossover voting by White Democrats).
84.
Id. at 490.
85.
See id. at 492-96.
86.
See id. at 494. The only additional digression to other cases was on whether
CVAP was the relevant voting population for Latinos, an issue that took place within the
space of a footnote. Id.
87.
Session states that "any examination of the totality of circumstances beyond
Gingles must include proportionality," id. at 492, but its focus on proportionality belies the
suggestion that it is merely a necessary part of the totality inquiry.
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minority population and safe districts into a safe harbor, if not an affirmative defense.
The court did disclaim, however, that "[j]ust as the Supreme Court
in De Grandy made clear that 'proportionality' of opportunity cannot be a
'safe harbor' precluding § 2 liability, which turns on total circumstances,
so, too, a showing of lack of proportionality is but one factor in the total
circumstances analysis. '88 Furthermore, the court took from De Grandy
that no single statistic can serve as a shortcut in determining minority
vote dilution.89Yet, as Judge Higginbotham observed, Justice Souter's
opinion in De Grandy also left open the possibility that proportionality
could assume greater importance depending on the facts. 90 If the facts
could elevate proportionality above the Gingles preconditions, history of
discrimination, or even racially polarized voting, then the battles between
redistricters and challengers would be fought over the mechanics of proportionality. Aptly, the remainder of the dilution analysis in Session turned
to the proper frame of reference for proportionality.9 '
Courts remain divided over precisely what frame of reference to use
for the minority population and safe district percentages. Although De
Grandy resolved proportionality for Latinos in Dade County,92 it provided
no specific guidance for future courts. In Session, the state wanted to use
South and West Texas as the frame of reference, where Latinos comprised
58% of the• - CVAP
and already possessed six safe districts out of seven
93
total districts. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, wanted to look at the
entire state; since Latinos represented 22% of the CVAP in Texas, they
were entitled to at least seven safe districts out of thirty-two total districts. 94 The court sided with the defendants, since South and West Texas
was the only area where the Gingles preconditions could be met.99 But
88.
Id. at 493 n.127.
89.
"The Supreme Court has made clear that 'the degree of probative value assigned
to proportionality may vary with other facts. No single statistic provides courts with a
shortcut to determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority
voting strength.'" Id. (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020-21). Significantly, Justice
O'Connor also quoted this passage in Georgia v. Ashcrofi, but only the second sentence was
excerpted ('No single statistic . . .'), and it was in the context of de-emphasizing the impact
of a minority group's effective exercise of electoral franchise in the totality of circumstances. See 539 U.S. at 4799-80. Because Ashcroft was concerned mainly with deemphasizing the three Gingles preconditions that went into effective exercise of electoral
franchise, it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would have touted any factor
over all else in totality.
90.
Again, "the degree of probative value assigned to proportionality may vary with
other facts." Session, 298 E Supp. 2d at 493 n.127 (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020-

21).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

298 E Supp. 2d at 493-94.
512 U.S. at 1022.
298 E Supp. 2d at 492-93.
Id. Six out of 32 would have been 19%; seven out of 32 would have been 22%.
Id. at 493.
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due to the uncertainty from Justice Souter's opinion, Judge
Higginbotham noted that, in the alternative, De Grandy never required
"mathematical" agreement between the minority population and majority-minority district percentages-"rough proportionality" throughout
Texas would have been enough.96
Adopting an equally functional stanceJudge Ward argued that while
Plan 1385C proposed situating an additional majority-Latino district in
South and West Texas, the plaintiffs' overall argument was that Latino influence would be diluted statewide by Plan 1374C. 97 Hence, Texas itself
was the proper frame of reference.Judge Ward responded to the majority's
defense of Plan 1374C, that it led to safe districts at a percentage close to
the Latino share of Texas's CVAP,98 on two grounds. First, the 22% figure
skirted the fact that Latinos constituted 32% of Texas's population and
29% of its VAP, so six safe districts fell well short of the state's obligation
for nine or ten safe districts.99 Additionally, since Congressional seats are
apportioned from overall population, Texas reaped a windfall by using the
Latino population to gain two extra Congressional seats but curbed Latino voting power by drawing their districts in a more restrictive way.100
Ultimately, Judge Ward failed to persuade the court that the entirety
of Texas was the proper framework for proportionality analysis. This was a
more favorable framework because of the Latino population distribution
statewide and in South and West Texas: 58% of the VAP, with six safe districts out of seven total districts.' ° Yet we might imagine another situation
where the state is less favorable a frame of reference for minority challengers-say, if eastern Texas were 15% Latino but had one safe district out of
ten total districts, or if western South Dakota were 65% American Indian
but offered two safe districts out of ten total districts. In this counterfactual,
Texas and South Dakota would opt to measure proportionality statewide.
Such a counterfactual also demonstrates the stakes of getting the court to
adopt a party's argument on "relevant area" for proportionality. In complicated cases of vote dilution, winning the relevant-area argument would
position a side for winning the proportionality factor.

96.

Id. at 493-94 (discussing De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1023-24).

97.

Id. at 525.

98.

Id. at 525-26 (citing Revised State Defendants' Trial Brief, filed December 3,

2003).
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 526.
See id.
Id. at 492-93.
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v. Perry
3.The Reemergence of Gingles 1: Session
2
as a Shaw II Challenge

Despite stressing population equality for Congressional districts,' °3
the Supreme Court has permitted deviation from "one-person one-vote"
for rational and legitimate state policies. 04 Such policies include creating
compact districts, preserving municipal boundaries, and avoiding contests
between incumbents.' 5 Even the VRA has been invoked as a compelling
justification for departure from one-person one-vote. 10 6 For its part, Session recognized the broad power of states in drawing districts to remedy
Section 2 violations.IN Yet it inverted the traditional conception of Section 2's relationship to one-person one-vote when it defended Texas' use
of oblong, "bacon-strip" shaped districts to replace District 23. While Section 2 has justified deviation from population equality, in Session,
population equality was used to justify the creation of extremely elongated districts which challenge our understanding of size and compactness
from Gingles 1.
To compensate for the spillover of Latino population into District
28 from District 23, the Texas legislature reconfigured four districts in
South and West Texas to cover more territory and travel further north
than under the previous plan.'0 8 The result was a set of flattened, elongated districts with high-density population pockets at either end of the
bacon-strip districts.'0 9 Combining more voters from both central Texas
and the border with Mexico, these changes were necessary to comply
with one-person one-vote." 0 Naturally, the plaintiffs made a Shaw-style
challenge of facial bizarreness, which the Eastern District rebutted with

102.
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II).
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,732-33 (1983).
103.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,577-81 (1964).
104.
Karcher,462 U.S. at 740.
105.
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,978 (1996) ("States retain a flexibility that federal
106.
courts enforcing 5 2 lack ... insofar as deference is due to their reasonable fears of, and
their reasonable efforts to avoid, 5 2 liability"). Justice O'Connor was not entirely confident about this, and she wrote two opinions: while her opinion announcing the Court's
judgment declared that 5 2 can be a compelling state interest, id. at 977, her concurring
opinion sympathized with the state juggling between competing liabilities, see id. at 99395 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
298 F Supp. 2d at 499 (citing Vera, 517 U.S. at 978). For further support of a
107.
state's broad 5 2 remedial powers, Judge Higginbotham cited Ashcroft on retrogression:
"under § 5, a state may choose to create a certain number of effective majority-minority
districts or a greater number of minority influence districts." 298 F Supp. 2d at 499 n.148.
Id. at 504.
108.
109.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 504,507.
110.
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the comparative smallest-circle and perimeter-to-area measurements of
Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C."'
But perhaps this type of comparison, borrowed from retrogression
analysis, is the wrong way to approach one-person one-vote and vote dilution. It may have been more appropriate to look at the kinds of
populations that were being lumped together, from a due process perspective of minimum standards instead of an equal protection perspective of
comparative equality. Under both the old and new plans, District 23 extended 800 miles along the Mexico border, and District 13 spanned
40,000 square miles and 43 counties, many with fewer than 3000 people. 1 2 These districts surely push the notions of geographic compactness
from Gingles 1."1 Even under Dillard's functional analysis," 4 it would be
hard to justify drawing oddly shaped remedial districts where economically diverse Latinos are lumped together and where Congressional
representatives must travel from Central Texas to the Rio Grande Valley to
meet their constituents. ' 15
The court did scrutinize evidence demonstrating that structurally,
these districts enabled Latinos the effective opportunity to elect their candidates of choice." 6 However, one wonders whether there is not some
backsliding on the economic progress that Latinos in central Texas have
made when they are lumped politically with poorer Latinos to the South.
This choice, between (i) protecting discrete and insular minorities and
(ii) reinforcing their discreteness and insularity through majority-minority
districts, is a choice that Ashcroft has forced into the open.1 7 However this
ends, we might question whether the combination of Ashcroft and Easley v.
Cromartie,"1 which ends the Shaw line of cases, appropriately delegates
that decision to jurisdictions with a history of racial vote dilution.

111.
See id. at 506-07.
112.
Id. at 507.
113.
For example, 77% of the population in majority-Latino District 25 came from
the endpoints of the district. Id. at 502.
114.
See Dillard. 686 E Supp. at 1462-71 (granting size and compactness if a district
can point to the existence of a community of interest).
115.
See Session, 298 E Supp.2d at502-04.
116.
See id. at 502-04.
117.
See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917 n.9 (offering states the option of creating either a
majority-minority district or more minority influence districts).
118.
532 U.S. 234 (2001), also cited inSession, 298 F Supp. 2d at 506 n. 189. Cromartie
basically ended the use of district irregularity, borrowed from Shaw, as circumstantial evidence that race predominated at redistricting. Even in 2002, one commentator wondered
whether Cromartie would "reintroduce the bizarre districts of the 1990s through the use of
a different rationale." See Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small
Treatise Accompanied by Districting Guidelinesfor Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U. RICH.
L. REV. 137,217 (2002).
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MIDPOINTS ALONG THE EVOLUTION FROM SHIRT TO SESSION

For all their differences about totality of circumstances in the aftermath of Ashcroft, Shirt and Session at least comprise two endpoints in a
continuum which shows that racial vote dilution can diminish. In Shirt,
twelve of twelve factors in the totality pointed to South Dakota's qualitative dilution of American Indian votes. Crossover voting was low, and the
number of safe districts fell well short of the state's proportionality obligation. Session was undoubtedly more complicated, in part because Texas
had made genuine effort to draw majority-minority districts, even if they
came out on "the low end of rough proportionality."' 1' 9 Racial vote dilution was less blatant, with the legislature's showing of proportionality and
with Gingles difficulties in devising alternate plans. Moreover, the court
120
engaged in both qualitative and quantitative scrutiny of Plan 1374C.
The progression from Shirt to Session thus demonstrates at least the propensity of covered jurisdictions for improvement.
This Section examines the midpoints along that continuum of improvement. By looking at other post-Ashcroft cases, this Section explores
the mechanics and norms underpinning the pronouncement that Session
is a better predicament to be in than Shirt. Part A looks at the debate surrounding influence districts as a cognizable injury, a question Ashcroft left
open. 2 1 Part B looks at Ashcroft's conflation of Section 2 and Section 5 of
the VRA. Part C returns to influence districts, this time as a remedy,
which implicates a state's flexibility in meeting proportionality obligations.
A. Influence Districts as Injury
One twist on the structural ability of minorities to "pull, haul, and
trade
as a result of Georgia v. Ashcroft is that the dismantling of influence
' 1 22

119.
298 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (Ward,J., dissenting).
120.
I borrow these terms from Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority
Representation, 92 CAi. L. REv. 1589 (2004). Professor Hayden organizes the history section
in his article into "The Right of Access" (covering the early case law denying Black
Americans access to the ballot box), "The Right to an Equally Weighted Vote: Addressing
'Quantitative Vote Dilution' " (covering the Shaw line of one-person one-vote cases), and
"The Right to a Meaningful Vote: Addressing 'Qualitative Vote Dilution'" (covering
Ashcroft and its precursors).
121.
Distinct from coalition and safe districts, influence districts are where minority
voters might not be able to elect their candidate of choice, but can play a substantial role
in the electoral process. In an influence district, no combination of minority populations
amounts to 50% of the district. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 470; see also Richard H. Pildes, Is
Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80
N.C.L. REV. 1517, 1539 (2002).
122.
Wording taken from De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020 ("minority voters are not
immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground").
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districts may provide the basis for a retrogression or vote dilution claim.
As Judge Ward put it, if Ashcroft found that "the most effective way to
maximize minority voting strength is to create more influence or coalition
districts, then the most effective way to minimize minority voting strength
may be to dismantle those districts."123The Supreme Court had on prior
occasions declined to address how influence districts fit into VRA
claims, 2 4 but with Ashcroft, both sides in the debate felt like precedent was
finally on their side.
Barely one month after Ashcroft came down, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited to it as support for the position that a reduction in
influence districts was as cognizable an injury as a reduction in safe districts. In McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm'n, the court reasoned
that since the VRA helps transition America into a society where race no
longer matters, recognizing influence dilution claims would hasten that
transition, presumably by fostering racial crossover voting.12s Similarly, the
First Circuit in Metts v. Murphy refused to dismiss an influence dilution
claim, having taken Ashcroft to confirm that influence districts are as im-6
portant as crossover districts in assessing minority voting strength.1
However, Session casts doubt on Metts on procedural grounds1 27 because
the First Circuit took Metts en banc and vacated the panel decision, and
Rodriguez v. Pataki 28 criticized Metts on substantive grounds as contradistinct from a line of cases advocating the "bright-line approach" of

majority-minority districts.

29

123.
Session, 298 E Supp. 2d at 529-30 (Ward,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
124.
See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1008-09; Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154
(1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25,41 (1993).
125.
828 A.2d 840, 853 (N.J. 2003). This idea goes as far back as South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966), where the Supreme Court noted that Congress had
enacted the VRA to end racial discrimination in voting. It was reformulated by Justice
O'Connor in Ashcroft: "the Voting Rights Act, as properly interpreted, should encourage
the transition to a society where race no longer matters: a society where integration and
color-blindness are not just qualities to be proud of,but are simple facts of life." 539 U.S. at
490-91.
126.
347 F3d 346, No. 02-2204, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 21987, *27 (1st Cir. 2003).
127.
298 E Supp. 2d at 476 n.75. Yet Metts came back to the First Circuit on an even
more tenuous claim, that vote dilution can be shown where the Black population in an
influence district drops from 26% to 21%. The First Circuit ended up reversing the lower
court's ruling that a vote dilution claim can be resolved at the motion to dismiss phase of a
trial. 363 F3d 8 (2004).
128.
308 E Supp. 2d at 383.
129.
E.g., Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 E2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (majority opinion authored
by Judge Higginbotham). See Rodriguez, 308 F Supp. 2d at 383 (listing cases that belied a
functional approach to ability-to-elect claims); Hall v. Virginia, 276 F. Supp. 2d 528, 538
(E.D. Va. 2003) (emphasizing "the well-established and objective rule requiring a majorityminority district").
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More compelling than administrative ease, though, may be the intuition that influence districts are different from safe and coalition districts
altogether, too amorphous to form a retrogression or vote dilution
benchmark. Deliberating vote dilution claims in several Long Island
counties, Rodriguez distinguished influence districts from coalition districts, where significant and reliable crossover voting, usually between
Blacks and Latinos, enables combining those groups for Gingles 1.13° Rodriguez suggested that relaxing the requirements of Gingles 1 would
"effectively eviscerate" Gingles 3; by allowing smaller groups of racial
minorities to pass as sufficiently large, courts would ease the burden of
showing that whites always outvote the minority.3 1 Conversely, as another
post-Ashcroft decision put it, if minorities could convert influence districts
into "effective" majority-minority districts, then minority plaintiffs would
132
always fail to prove that the majority White bloc outvotes them.
These concerns build on Justice Souter's caution in Ashcroft that influence short of coalition is too difficult to gauge. 33While Justice Souter
warned against using influence districts to satisfy a state's remedial obligation, Rodriguez and other cases preview the disarray that will arise with
the next generation of retrogression and vote dilution cases, where influence districts have been
approved as remedy and come to form the
134
baselines for tomorrow.
B. Remedial 5 2 Obligations versus Procedural5 5 Obligations
A difference does exist, however, between influence districts as injury and influence districts as remedy. This difference turns on the
distinction between a jurisdiction's remedial Section 2 obligations and procedural Section 5 obligations.' Early on, cases attacked racially dilutive
130.
308 F.Supp. 2d at 374-76. Factually, Rodriguez is an interesting counterpart to
Session v.Perry. Whereas in Session population increases led to Texas gaining two Congressional seats, 298 E Supp. 2d at 457, in New York lower relative population growth led to
the state dropping two Congressional seats, 308 F Supp. 2d at 354.
131.
Rodriguez, 308 F Supp. 2d at 394.
132.
Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 E Supp. 2d 291, 300 (D. Mass. 2004).
Galvin and Rodriguez come out differently, with Galvin finding influence dilution, id. at
312, and Rodriguez not, 308 E Supp. 2d at 353-54, but it is telling that they share the same
concern about influence districts.
133.
See 539 U.S. at 495 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court gives no guidance for
measuring influence that falls short of the voting strength of a coalition member, let alone
a majority of minority voters.").
134.
Assuming, of course, that the VP.A survives Congressional approval in 2007.
135.
As Judge Ward summarized in his Session dissent:
[T]he majority first tells us that District 25 was created "to avoid retrogression under Section 5." Quite correctly, the majority recognizes that the
changes to District 23 resulted in the dilution of the Latino vote therein. But
then ... the majority explains that the state enjoys the flexibility under
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districts under Section 5, triggered only when covered jurisdictions
changed their voting practices. 136 But Section 5 covered only changes in
districting, offering no remedy for pre-existing dilutive plans; meanwhile,
Section 2 required plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent and discriminatory impact in a redistricting plan.1 37 After Congress amended the VRA
in 1982, Section 2 was taken out of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth38
intent.1
Amendment framework which required proof of discriminatory
Henceforth decoupled from Constitutional claims, Section 2 became the
go-to portion of the VRA in voting rights litigation. 39
How much of Section 2 is left, then, after Georgia v. Ashcroft, whose
retrogression analysis has been applied to Gingles-style vote dilution?
Courts have used Ashcroft's recoupling of the two sections as convenient
precedent for discriminatory intent.1 40 In fact, Ashcroft seems to have so
balkanized Section 2 analysis that courts now understand racial vote dilu41
tion charges to face even greater barriers than retrogression charges.
This does seem to contradict the preference of challengers for Section 2
because of its more exacting burden on the state. In Reno v. Bossier Parish,
for example, Justice O'Connor refused to collapse retrogression into vote
dilution; whereas allegedly dilutive plans were held against the paragon of
De Grandy to draw Gingles districts in a different way, so long as it creates a
total of six (but only six) districts in which Latinos may elect a candidate of
choice. But Gingles addresses liability under § 2 .... The majority blurs the
distinction between the State's flexibility to comply with its procedural obligations under § 5 and its flexibility to comply with its remedial obligations
under § 2.
Session, 298 F Supp. 2d at 521 (emphasis in original).
See Hayden, supra note 120, at 1601. One example is Beer v. United States, 425
136.
U.S. 130 (1976).
See Hayden, supra note 120, at 1601-02.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.; see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476 (1997) (indicating
139.
that Sections 2 and 5 "combat different evils and ... impose very different duties upon the
States.").
See, e.g., Session, 298 E Supp. 2d at 480 ("While Ashcrofi is a § 5 preclearance case
140.
addressing the question of retrogression, the Court's opinion makes plain that safe districts
are no longer untouchable. States previously read Gingles as requiring safe districts to ensure the election of minorities by countering racially polarized voting."). Session was
brought, however, as a dilution challenge. But see McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment
Comm'n Of State, 828 A.2d at 840, 853-54 (citing Ashcrofi's conflating of Sections 2 and
5, though for another purpose-upholding the plaintiff's claim of influence dilution.)
Such was the hunch in Metts, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis at *19, which approached
141.
influence dilution tentatively-that is, although Ashcroft recognized influence claims in the
Section 5 context, it did not automatically translate into recognizing influence claims in
the Section 2 context. Even more explicit is Rodriguez, which said that "[w]hile Ashcroft
allows crossover districts under Section 5, its reasoning does not broaden the power of
federal courts under section 2 of the VRA to require state legislatures to protect or create
such 'ability to elect' districts." 308 E Supp. 2d at 384.
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a "hypothetical, undiluted plan," retrogression was measured against a
concrete baseline, on which the state needed not improve. 4 2 On the other
hand, Section 5 was equally restrictive with covered jurisdictions because
it imposed on them "the difficult burden of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose and effect."' 43 This makes sense if one recalls that
Section 5 targeted the worst offenders of voting discrimination. Section 2,
in contrast, applied to all jurisdictions, so it allowed states flexibility in
drawing nondilutive districts. 144 If a covered jurisdiction overstepped the
freedoms of Section 2, it would theoretically still be constrained by the
Section 5 approval procedure.
The debate about retrogression and vote dilution is now moot. Regardless of which VRA section used to be tougher, Georgia v. Ashcroft
seems to have mixed the lax parts of both provisions into a new hybrid.
When covered jurisdictions now submit redistricting plans for approval,
they can invoke their broad remedial power in drawing districts. And
when plans are challenged for dilutive effect, legislatures can point to a
lack of discriminatory purpose. This has a profound consequence on the
way plaintiffs bring forth claims. Before Ashcroft, courts seldom dealt with
influence dilution;'4 5 after Ashcroft, the stakes have been raised. Because a
state can now use influence districts as a remedy, challengers have fought
back on the procedural end, pointing to the dismantling of a benchmark
influence district as a cognizable injury.
C. Influence Districts as Remedy
These issues-the progression of influence districts from remedy to
injury and the conflation of a state's remedial and procedural obligations-have great bearing on proportionality. The next round of voting
rights cases will likely be fought over the benchmarks that this generation's remedial influence districts eventually become. Even as the
floodgates open to influence dilution, courts will have the rest of the decade to deal with legislatures redistricting in response to the 2000 census.
And given the current deference to re-redistricting, we might expect a
spate of lawsuits arising from the fissure of safe districts into influence
districts. Already, there are signs that states have taken up Ashcroft's invitation to crack safe districts in the name of partisanship, incumbency, and
142.
See 520 U.S. at 480.
143.
Id. (emphasis in original).
144.
See Vera, 517 U.S. at 978 (1996) (indicating that states possess a flexibility in
remedying vote dilution that federal courts lack). This forms the basis for Judge
Higginbotham's reliance on a state's broad Section 2 enforcement powers.
145.
See Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 E3d
271 (2d Cir. 1994) (one of the few pre-2003 cases on influence dilution); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 281 F Supp. 2d 436 (N.D.N.Y
2003) (a contemporary of Ashcroft on the topic).
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even preserving minority voting strength. These justifications are critical
in passing Section 2 discriminatory purpose scrutiny, after which states
can point to more than ample proportionality.
Such were the justifications proffered by the Massachusetts legislature in Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 146 after its 2001 Enacted Plan
changed the boundaries of a Black safe district so that it became majority-White, while maintaining the boundaries of another majority-White
district where Representative Kevin Fitzgerald would be the sole incumbent.1 47 In defending its Plan, the legislature pointed first to the Black
CVAP of 22.07%, and then included in proportionality analysis the five
districts where Blacks and Latinos supposedly could combine to elect
their preferred candidates. 48 Hence, the legislature concluded, Blacks had
nine "functional equivalents" of majority-minority districts out of seven149
teen total districts-52.94%, more than what proportionality called for.
The District of Massachusetts rejected this argument; De Grandy explicitly
linked the minority share of the population to the number of majorityminority districts." s Oddly enough, in spite of that explicit link, some
plaintiffs have successfully argued that legislatures did not unpack safe districts enough, or consider influence districts as remedial possibilities, to
spread out minority influence."'
Shortly after citing De Grandy, the District of Massachusetts did a
curious pirouette: it applied proportionality analysis to Whites in the Boston area and noted that their safe districts exceeded their share of the
population."' Should future courts look at both minority and White numbers, proportionality may become more firmly entrenched as a safe

146.
300 F Supp. 2d at 297 ("[T]he defendants urged us to refrain from engaging in
an unnecessary 'tinkering exercise' because the Enacted Plan furnishes African American
and Hispanic voters with electoral opportunities that are no worse than 'roughly proportional' to their percentage of the relevant population"). Note the blend of"no worse than"
and "roughly proportional," wording that had been distinctly emblematic of retrogression
and dilution.
147.
The brainchild of Representative Fitzgerald, this portion of the Enacted Plan
was adopted only because Fitzgerald had stated that he would not run for re-election. He
changed his mind afterward. See id. at 295-96.
148,
See id. at 311.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. at 312.
151.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, and Metts, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis *1, are such examples.
These successes, though, trap challengers at pleading between two equally unappealing
options: arguing on one hand that influence districts do not adequately remedy an unpacked safe district and on the other hand that an influence district should not have been
dismantled because it functioned like a safe district.
152.
See Galvin, 300 F Supp. 2d at 312 (observing that the Enacted Plan gave Whites
control over 70.6% of the area's twelve districts, while they only comprised 55% of the
VAP).
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harbor, as the most neutral way to satisfy competing claims." 3 There is,
however, one powerful value countering such a move: substantive representation, which drove much of Justice O'Connor's reasoning in
Ashcroft. 114 While Justice O'Connor's deferral to Georgia's ability to
choose between descriptive and substantive representation favored no position over the other, her last words in the opinion, anticipating the
transformation of America into a race-blind society, suggest that she preferred the mode of representation where officials and constituents are tied
more by core values than outward appearance.'5 5
III.THE SUBSTANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Much has been written about the tension between descriptive and
substantive representation since Hanna Pitkin's influential book, The Concept of Representation. Commentators have formulated extremely
sophisticated theories about both modes of representation, dissecting their7
6
internal processes 1 and mapping out their macropolitical consequences.1
This Note concludes by taking a more basic approach to substantive representation, which seems to have moved into the limelight with Georgia v.
Ashcroft. Beginning with the values couched in substantive representation,
this Part will distinguish between symptoms of racially nonpolarized voting
and instrumentsfor achieving racially nonpolarized voting.
That the Voting Rights Act, in the words ofJustice O'Connor, seeks
"to prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise ' '... is a
notion held since the earliest jurisprudence on the VRA.1 9 More questionable, though, is whether the VRA was intended to "foster our

153.
By then, we may have tumbled down the slippery slope toward proportional
representation.
154.
See 539 U.S. at 481.
155.
See id. at 490. This seems to comport with Justice O'Connor's deeply held belief
that America will move, and has to move, beyond race-conscious decisions. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343 (2003).
156.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HAuv. L. REv. 28 (2004) (breaking down democratic politics into its institutional components); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HAsv. L. Rsv. 1099 (2005)
(classifying diversity into its first- and second-order species).
157.
See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 120, at 1609. In his article, Professor Hayden attributes Democratic losses in the South to the push for safe districts, which potentially moved
the areas around these safe districts to the Republicans. Evidence of this "bleaching effect"
in descriptive representation, Hayden says, is the strange alliance we saw in Georgia v.
Ashcroft-conservative Republicans and the civil rights community. Id. at 1609-13.
158.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 490.
159.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301 ("The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress
to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral
process in parts of our country for nearly a century.").
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transformation into a society that is no longer fixed on race.' ' 16 Even
while voting rights litigation evolved from (i) safeguarding minority access to the ballot box to (ii) the right to an equally weighted vote to
(iii) the right to a meaningful vote, 6 ' the push to expel race consciousness
was only to ensure structural equality in the "ability to elect." As courts
became more uneasy with the fixation on race, they began to target the
most obviously racial classification in the electoral structure: safe districts, 62 the one area where race-conscious decisions had been permitted
out of remedial necessity. Stigmatizing safe districts, however, is not only
premature if the attitudes behind racially polarized voting are not yet
wiped out; it can be counterproductive, eliminating the only redress minorities have in a historically suspect electoral system.1
63

To be sure, polarized voting forms a large part of the racial vote dilution inquiry, both as its own totality factor and in Gingles 2 and 3. 164
Where there is no racially polarized voting, there is no injury. Yet Gingles'
was a passive approach: Justice Brennan interpreted Section 2 merely as a
palliative for symptoms of racially polarized voting (minority candidates
of choice always being outvoted), not as a panacea for racially polarized
voting itself. Eliminating polarization would have required programs far
broader than the VRA, programs aimed at the social and economic causes
of minority discreteness and insularity. Thus, when the Ashcroft Court affirmed Georgia's disaggregation of safe districts as a mechanism for the

160.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 490 (citing De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 and Shaw II, 517 U.S.).
161.
See headings in Hayden, supra note 120, at 1595-1600; See also Summary of Contents in Pildes, supra note 6, at xiii, for the titles to Chapter 2 (The Right to Participate"),
Chapter 3 ("The Reapportionment Revolution"), and Chapter 9 ("Racial Vote Dilution
under the Voting Rights Act").
162.
See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020 (calling majority-minority districts as remedial
devices "the politics of second best" in comparison to those districts where coalitions with
other races help elect the minority candidates of choice); Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S.
630, 657 (1993) ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.").
163.
As Justice Souter noted in his Vera dissent:
[T]he price of imposing a principle of colorblindness in the name of the
Fourteenth Amendment would be submerging the votes of those whom the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to protect, precisely
the problem that necessitated our recognition of vote dilution as a constitutional violation in the first place ....Thus, unless the attitudes that produced
racial bloc voting were eliminated along with traditional districting principles, dilution would once again become the norm.
Vera, 517 U.S. at 1071-72 (SouterJ., dissenting).
164.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56 ("The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially
polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a
politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates".).
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substantive representation that would eradicate American racial fixation, it
made three logical leaps.
The first was that spreading minority voting strength across several
influence districts would actually lead to substantive representation, where
minorities "pull, haul, and trade" with Whites and where the candidate to
emerge better represents minority interests than the candidate to emerge
in a safe district, usually a minority herself. Yet the influence-district process of pulling, hauling, and trading is a far cry firom the coalition-district
process of pulling, hauling, and trading first articulated in De Grandy.'65 In
coalition districts, that process entails the interaction of two or more minority populations, otherwise submerged into the majority White
population and therefore more or less equal in bargaining power. Yet in
influence districts that process approaches a form of compromise antithetical to the VRA, forced upon minorities through one-on-one
66
interaction with the dominant population in majority-White districts 1
The second of Ashcroft's assumptions is that substantive representation would propel America toward race-neutral voting. More plausibly,
true substantive representation, in which official responsiveness to minorities endures beyond the campaign season, seems to stem from minorities
having achieved a visibility that Whites cannot ignore. 67 To push substantive representation upon districts not yet ready for crossover voting would
seem to confuse symptom with cause.
Finally, and most fundamentally, the third assumption is that racially
polarized voting even needs to be eradicated. The influence district,
where minorities substantially affect elections without necessarily being
able to elect their candidates of choice, creates an implicit hierarchy with
dominant and submissive coalition members.' 68 This subservience is a position that, for example, American Indians have fiercely rejected, on
principles more legally substantive than racial separatism. American Indians had, until recently, dealt with the US government as sovereign equals

165.
See 512 U.S. at 1020.
166.
Nor are these candidates of "second best" necessarily responsive, for the coalitions backing them are often ephemeral and their platforms incoherent. See Note, The Ties
that Bind: Coalitions and Governance under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 117 HAWv. L. R..
2621,2636 (2004).
167.
See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108
HtAv. L. R-Ev. 1359, 1387 (1995) (book review) (noting that representative responsiveness
to Black voters jumps sharply after the Black population reaches 40%). Though 10% shy of
a safe district, this 40% threshold is generally higher than the 40-50% and 25-30% influence districts upheld in Ashcroft.
168.
See Note, supra note 166, at 2636. The footnote to this discussion, moreover,
explicitly cites Native Americans as "paradigmatic example of a racial group often cast in
the submissive coalitional role." Id. at fn.92. Native American denotes those of indigenous
heritage more likely to pursue livelihoods in mainstream America than American Indians.
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instead of minorities in American society.1 69 This impulse of separation
reached its zenith with the American Indian Movement (AIM) of the
1960s, whose militancy inadvertently gave way to the absorption of Indians into American society as "Native Americans. 1 70 By shifting toward the
individual-rights orientation of the Civil Rights Movement, American
Indians would lose much of their cultural independence and political
strength. 7 1 And even though American Indians might not be an apt paradigm for all minorities, this much does hold constant: the greatest cultural
gains come largely out of visible and unpalatable activism, and the7 2greatest
cultural losses come after trading independence for submergence.
Whatever our feelings on racially polarized voting and cultural assimilation, we must be clear on the purpose of the Voting Rights Act. It
should combat every electoral scheme that thwarts minority enfranchisement. But it cannot, by dismantling those schemes as they arise, hope to
wipe out the motivation to disenfranchise. Understandably, courts have
shied away from redistricting cases as the arguments invoke more sophisticated variations of political nonjusticiability. Yet while the results from
nondilutive elections are indeed untouchable, a dilutive electoral process
should not be immune from judicial scrutiny. With Ashcroft, the Court has
done just the opposite, deferring to a state districting process because it
73
discerned the imprints of substantive representation. Vieth v.Jubeirer followed in that deference to electoral process instead of electoral result. In
remanding Session back to the district court to consider Vieth,1 74 the Supreme Court may have armed legislatures with even more arguments to
mask retrogressive and dilutive plans, thereby pushing the unspoken sunset
to the VRA-the end of polarized voting--even further.

169.
See generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of tile
Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous
Peoples, 15 HARv.BLACKLETTER J. 107 (1999). Though this article does not mention Professor Gerken's work on the individual-injury and group-injury dimensions of racial vote
dilution, the two pieces dovetail nicely. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to
an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1663 (2001).
170.
Porter, supra note 169, at 145.
171.
Id.
172.
Edward D. Gehres, III, Note, Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse, 17 J.L. & Poz. 135, 165 (2001).
173.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
174.
See 125 S. Ct.351 (2004).

